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Abstract : We study the impact of inter-group relationships, with inter-group distance, on  intra-group 
cooperation behavior for Indian rural households. This is an application to a real world case of some 
experimental results of the identity economics literature. This literature offers insight of channels 
through which inter-group relationships affect in-group actions, with identification to the in-group, and 
the resulting norm enforcement behavior. We proxy distance with differences of returns to attributes to 
one traditionally low status group (the Scheduled Castes, SC, standing for traditionally so-called 
“untouchables”), compared to the rest of the population (reference group). We then study the effect of 
this distance variable on in-group cooperation. In our data set, a cooperative behavior corresponds to the 
involvement in a collective action for water supply. Inter-group relationships appear to have the 
expected effect on intra-group cooperation for SC and households: the worst inter-group relationships, 
the more intra-group cooperation.
I / Introduction
How does inter-group relationships affect individual intra-group cooperative behavior? This 
question is of major importance since cooperation, through its importance for public goods, is 
necessary for economic development to take place1. Indeed cooperation can for example mean the 
acceptance of a local tax, to finance a school, a well, or another shared good; or a political lobbying 
action, if the attribution of the public good is decided at local level (Banerjee et al. (2008)). Taking 
this form of a collective action, cooperation faces two issues that make her prone to suboptimal 
equilibrium: first, with the disconnection of private and public interest, when there are positive 
externalities; or, second, with free riding, if the produced good is not excludable. One way out of 
these suboptimal equilibrium is coercive institutions. Coercive institutions will comply everybody 
to participate in the collective action at a given level of commitment, ruling-out free ridding 
behavior. These institutions can be more or less formal, and more or less able to play their part, 
according to the different economic or social contexts. And the building and functioning of coercive 
institutions is not an obvious one, so collective action (depending upon them) remains a puzzling 
topic. Moreover, this puzzling topic happens to be detrimental for developing countries, as the lack 
of public goods has now been identified as a serious handicap in their expansion paths.  And   as 
States do not always have the power and or resources to play their part of coercive institutions it is 
often up to social group to handle it (see for example Miguel and Gugerty (2005) with parent 
1. “Cooperation is said to occur when two or more individuals engage in joint actions that result in mutual  
benefits” Bowles and Gintis (2008)
1groups in Kenya), with intra- or inter group- cooperation according to what public good is at stake.
This article is an empirical work on the determinants of intra group cooperation in rural 
India (database presented below). The hypothesis to be tested is that inter-group distance has an 
impact on cooperation behaviors. Then, not only would cooperation depend on relationships 
between people supposed to cooperate together (a question extensively studied by a literature 
briefly introduced below), but also relationships between people supposed to cooperate together and 
people around them. We will concentrate our analysis on Scheduled Castes (SC) households, 
standing for the so called untouchables, a rather well identified group that is still today at the margin 
of Indian society (cf Thorat Newman (2010)).
Answering to that question leads us between two main stream of the literature: empirical 
work on cooperation and the experimental and theoretical literature about identity. Previous 
empirical works have first considered the impact of economic attributes, and mainly the impact of 
inequalities. Whether economic inequality is good, or bad, for collective action is a controversial 
question empirically (Bandiera et al. (2005), Khwaja (2009)) and theoretically (see Bardhan et al. 
(2007)). More recently social aspects have also been taken in account with a strong debate between 
tenants of fragmentation measure vs. tenants of polarization measure. The first consider that the 
more different groups in a community, the worst for cooperation (Banerjee et al. (2005), Vigor 
(2004)); meanwhile Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003), tenants of the second position, argue that 
the worst is to have two groups of equal size, opposing one another. Very few empirical works are 
made at individual level because of data limitations. Olken’s (2008) study of Indonesian villagers' 
willingness to contribute to a program, according to the retained type of decision process, is a 
remarkable exception. But his problematic was the effect of direct participation in decision 
processes, not social relationships. Aggarwal’s (2000) study on group owned wells in south India is 
another nice exception. His attempts at explaining intra-group variation in cooperation behavior 
according to the action at stake is stimulant. But he does not deal with the  inter-group relationships 
question. Closer from our research question, and having had engaging formalization and results for 
us, are some theoretical or experimental work. First the formalization of identity proposed by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), insisting on how economic decisions are not just driven by economic 
payoffs. Also, in laboratory settings, authors have shown, with populations as different as Papua 
New Ginea tribes or Swiss army recruits, that norms enforcement and level of cooperation are 
greater in the in-group (respectively Bernhard et al. (2006), and Goette et al. (2006)). As for the fact 
that a negative out-group perception might enforce in-group identity it has been shown by Chen and 
2Chen (2009) or McLeish and Oxoby (2007).
The value added of this article is on three main grounds. First, this article uses a unique 
dataset, allowing us to observe cooperation behavior at the individual level and test the effect of 
individual predictors but also the aggregated covariates used in most previous empirical studies 
(that use aggregated data). Second, the hypothesis we test is in line with the current work on how 
much our actions are shaped by social and identity considerations2, our results then offer a new 
example of the importance of identity questions in the economic life. And, last but not least, we put 
forward a new channel through which social capital affects cooperation. First regressions ran with 
basic social controls, as group dummies or share of group in the village, show no effect of them or 
small and non robust ones, which is surprising given the impact caste is still supposed to have in 
various ground in today India. So finding a pattern through which social setting can impact 
cooperation is important. 
The next section gives some theoretical justifications of   how distancing may impact 
cooperation. The dataset and variables (including the estimated distance variable) are presented in 
the third section, and the results are in the fourth one. The last section concludes.
II / Why should individual discrimination impact cooperation?
This article works on the effect of inter-group relationships on cooperative behavior, at the 
individual level. How are these two things linked? This section offers a very simple formalization 
answering to that question, and some examples of previous studies for how this formalization can 
fit facts.
2.1. Including distance effects in identity payoffs
Bringing social context as an argument of individual choice is a way opened by George A. 
Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, with their work on identity economics. Their augmented utility 
function, including identity, allow us to study differences in identity payoffs for SC according to 
their cooperative behavior in different social settings. Let us first describe the utility function. There 
are three arguments. The two first are traditional with ai the vector of I’s actions and a-i the vector of 
other’s actions. Then Ii, i’s identity or self image is added.
So Ui= U(ai, a-i, Ii)
2. A branch opened by Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
3And Ii itself depends of five arguments. Once again ai and a-i. But also gi, person i’s assignment (for 
herself and for others) to social group G. Individual i’s own given characteristics, ei, that can match 
more or less its category’s ideal P. P stands for ideal and prescriptions about what is the appropriate 
behavior to have according to social categories (different social categories can have different 
prescriptions).
Hence Ii= I(ai, a-i, gi, ei, P)
We are interested in the impact of social distance on SCs decisions so we will concentrate 
mainly on SCs’ payoffs. Actions will depend on social categories so let us first present them. For the 
argument gi consider two social groups, SCs and non SCs. Here the social group is not a choice: 
being SC or not (that is NCS) is an inherited identity (given in ei). And in the hierarchy of the 
ancient Hindu texts SCs are at the bottom of the social ladder. Then there are two possible activities 
ai for non SCs. Either to agree for close relationships with SCs with action No Distance (ND), but 
this will lower their identity payoffs bys x because their ideal is to consider themselves and to be 
considered of higher social status, or to maintain a high Distance (action D) restoring their identity 
utility by reminding to SC their supposedly lower social status at cost z. This maintenance of social 
distance is a way to keep SCs apart from the rest of the society that lowers SCs’ identity utility of –
s. Consider then two possible activities for SCs, within group cooperation (C) or non cooperation 
(NC). Cooperation is socially valorized by group members, it would be the ideal prescription P, 
bringing utility H. Non cooperation would bring a lower identity utility H-n.
One gets the payoff matrix:                                                                                  
SC
ai Cooperation No Cooperation
NSC Distance -z ; H-s -z ; H-n-s
No Distance -x ; H -x ; H-n
Table 1: payoffs matrix for SC and non SC.
By construction C oftentimes yield higher payoffs to SC than NC3. So equilibrium outcome 
is maintained distance (D), and cooperation (C) if z<x. Or no distance (ND) and cooperation (C) if 
z>x. In a lot of cases distance is indeed maintained in India so z<x condition is not an aberrant 
condition (cf Thorat Newman (2010), or Borooah (2001)). This D action does not change the 
equilibrium strategy for SCs since Cooperation is a dominant strategy, but it will lower SCs’ 
identity payoffs. And if one makes the standard assumption of a concave utility function, here 
3. This does not mean that SCs would oftentimes cooperate as identity payoffs are not the only ones taken in 
account in the utility function: the status gain is not necessarily high enough to rule out free riding.
4concave   over   identity  payoffs,   identity  gains   will   have   decreasing   marginal   returns.  Then 
Cooperation becomes a more interesting choice when one has its status lowered (this holds no 
matter if n>s or n<s). All else being equal, if a high social distance is maintained by non SCs, the 
Cooperation action will have higher marginal utility returns for SCs. This result depends on three 
assumptions: that utility function includes identity and is concave, that maintained social distance 
induces a status loss for SCs, and that Cooperation induces a status gain for SCs. This extremely 
simple formalization shows how the free rider problem could be ruled off by identity concerns. 
People set apart by the high status people in the society could seek for counterbalancing that loss of 
status with a higher social consideration from their pairs.
2.2. Examples that low social status goes along with high identification and high identification 
with high cooperation.
One can also justify these assumptions and interpretations with results found by behavioral 
economics, showing how group settings modify group members’ actions. The reasoning is in two 
steps. First, the effect of being distanced by others -previously formalized by a change in payoffs- 
would here be assimilated to an increased identification to the group. And second, the more one 
feels (or want to feel) part of a group, the more she will internalize its ideal, and adopt and enforce 
its norms, leading to increased in group cooperation.
About the first step of identification, the idea is that group identity becomes all the more 
important for an individual that she is rejected by other group members. Examples of such a 
behavior are found by Branscombe et al. (1999). In a study of US racial prejudices they show that 
“the generally negative consequences of perceiving oneself as a victim of racial prejudice can be 
somewhat alleviated by identification with the minority group”. McLeish and Oxoby (2007) found 
result of the same vein, using artificially built groups and make a bridge to the second step of 
cooperation. For them “lower out group opinion (relative to own opinion) will reinforce in-group 
identity, resulting in greater cooperation within the in-group” (and conversely for a higher out-
group opinion). What they call “lower out group opinion” is what we want to capture with our 
distance variable (to be presented in next section). And being distanced by out group members 
going along with feeling close to in-group members, that is identifying to the in-group.
Introduced by McLeish and Oxoby example, the increased compliance to group norms, in 
case of higher identification, is also shown by Goette et all. (2006). Random assignment of new 
Swiss army recruits to different platoons allow them to show that when an agent identifies herself as 
a member of a social group, she will modify her behavior. She will adopt roles, norms and values of 
this group. And cooperation between two people of the same group will be higher than between two 
5recruits of different groups. Following Tajfel (1982) work numerous other studies show an in-group 
bias for cooperative behavior, even with groups built on minimal criteria (like a pretended 
preference for Klee or Kandinsky to justify random assignment).
III / Data
In order to bring these predictions to data we will use the Indian Human Development 
Survey, collected in 2005  by researchers from the University of Maryland and the National Council 
of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), New Delhi. This database covers  26,734 rural4 
households, in 1,521 villages, comprised in 1,123 teshils, themselves included in 287 districts5; 32 
Indian states are represented6. Besides having this large coverage the designers of IHDS2005 have 
carefully measured income, that will be a key variable for our measure of social distance. The 
survey design and sampling seem to be reliable one, and consumption estimates converge with the 
NSS consumption estimate for most states. Still there is no convergence for  three states that will 
later be excluded from the sample as a robustness check7. The number of observations by village is 
at least 7 in 90% of the cases, the minimum is 1, the maximum 72, with a mean of 17,6 
observations by village and a median of 20. Village questionnaires where hold in parallel to 
household questionnaire, which allows us to get valid information at village level, even if the 
household sampling is not representative for this scale. From this dataset we obtain the explained 
variable of cooperation, but also significant information in order to estimate our distance variable, 
and a number of controls for our model.
3.1. Explained variable: cooperation
  The IHDS 2005 contains the question: “In some communities, when there is a water supply 
problem, people bond together to solve the problem. In other communities, people take care of their 
own families individually. What is your community like?” Possible answer: “Bond together” or 
“Each family individually”. We consider that this dyadic variable discloses the cooperative behavior 
of the household. Let us develop and justify this interpretation.
4. With the 2001 census definition of rural areas
5. If you keep both rural and urban data, IHDS 2005 covers 382 of the 612 Indian Districts of 2001.
6. There is no rural observations for Chandigar and Lakshadweep
7. We thank Ashwini Deshpande and Himanshu for that remark
6First, we are in a collective action problem. Indeed for the first 99.42% of the sample water 
availability appears to be a shared good (table 1). Some households can own well(s), thus having an 
access to several water sources which reduces the incentive to fix problems when they occur to one 
of the sources, hence shall reduce the cooperative behavior (Aggarwal (2000)). We will include in 
regressions a control for the 9,5% of sample households owning a tube well. Unfortunately we do 
not know if other kinds of wells are owned, but we know if the household owns any pump (used to 
exploit wells). We will hence control for tube well and pump owning. We hope this well owning 
question does not bias our results for three reasons. First, about 90% of the sample is not concerned 
by these elements, and our controls shall avoid biasing the estimation with the 10% of observations 
concerned with one of the aforementioned elements. Second, among these small percentages, one 
cannot say that because a household owns well(s) it does not also rely on a public water source: a 
lot of private wells are built for agricultural purpose, not for drinking purpose (Aggarwal (2000)). 
Third, the owned wells can be common properties. Often, when a well owner dies, his heritage is 
shared between his sons, and if had a well this well becomes a shared good.  In the two villages 
sampled for Aggarwal’s (2005) study on group-owned wells, 61,5% of households own no well at 
all, 32,1% own group-well(s), and 6,3% of households own well(s) alone (he actually included in 
that sample households that would own a well alone and another one shared). Hence the alternate 
water source possessed by households owning a well shall actually correspond for a number of 
them to a shared good (hence the expected effect of discrimination variables shall go in the same 
direction as for public sources), and it does not imply that they do not any more rely on other shared 
water sources, according to which purpose they have to fill (irrigation, cooking, or religious acts) 
since different sources are used according to the purpose (Singh (2004)). This is why we have 
considered that potentially all households depended -at least partially- upon shared sources, and 
have consequently chosen to keep all variables in our sample. Besides, our results in next section 
give further weight to the shared well hypothesis, as tube well owning has a positive impact on 
cooperation (which we interpret as small group property of the source, with norms within that small 
group being easier to enforce than within a larger one, like a neighbourhood). So we would consider 
that water sources are widely shared ones. And the act of fixing the water supply problem is 
comparable to building a new source of water. When there is a problem nobody can use the source 
(no matter if it is a well, a pond, etc), and everybody has to find alternatives. If the problem is fixed, 
everybody (neighbour inhabitants for a public source or well owners for a shared one) is free to use 
the source and nobody can be excluded. The traditional free-riding problem exposed in the 
introduction is then illustrated by the collective action aiming at fixing the problem. The household 
can decide to care only of himself, waiting for others to fix the problem without having to bear the 
7collective action costs. Everybody has an interest for the collective action to emerge, but without 
including himself in.
Frequence Percent Cumul
Hand pump 9,259 34.68 34.68
Piped 8,452 31.66 66.34
Open well 4,228 15.84 82.18
Tube well 3,321 12.44 94.62
Covered well 680 2.55 97.17
River 308 1.15 98.32
Pond 149 0.56 98.88
Truck 143 0.54 99.42
Rainwater or Bottled 27 0.1 99.52
Other 129 0.48 100
26,696 100
Table 2: household usual water source (IHDS 2005)
Second, we tend to interpret this variable as inter-group cooperation. There is no clear cut 
proof in any known data for this interpretation. But it is sustained by several facts and traits of 
Indian society. These traits lead us to think that SCs will not share the water source of any other cast 
group, more generally each social group (caste or religious one) is likely to have his own source(s). 
So then source users, supposed to fix the source, are socially homogeneous. There are three main 
arguments for this interpretation. First, in Hinduism, inter-caste contacts are reduced, in order to 
reduce the risk of “ritual pollution”. And water is a major vector of ritual pollution, so it is likely 
that different castes will not share the same well (Singh (2004)). Second, and as a consequence of 
contacts limitation, Indian villages are segregated. Each social group lives in a given neighborhood; 
and  the extreme is for people considered as “untouchable”: historically their neighborhood were 
constructed next to the village, rather than as a part of it8 (Anderson (2007), Deliege (2004)). Third, 
there are often several sources in a village. In 85,7  per cent of our sample villages at least two 
different type of water sources are registered. This imply that there are at least two different sources 
in the village (one of each type), and there can be a lot more (several of each type) according to the 
village size. So one can assume that each neighborhood often has his own water source. Hence our 
interpretation of the cooperation variable as standing for intra-group cooperation: if households 
sharing sources are often all from the same social group it is likely that cooperation to fix the source 
8. this is far less clear cut in cities, but we have excluded them from our sample
8will come from these user groups. Numerical evidence provided by our data are scarce: in our 
sample 16,8% of households appear to share their sources with only people of their caste. But these 
numbers are very likely to be underestimated, as we only have the type of source for the household. 
So, if you have two hand-pumps in the village, one for each of the two neighborhoods (hence social 
groups), we cannot see it on our data, and these people will be considered as sharing the same 
source. Our interpretation of cooperation variable thus mainly depend of what we know of the 
Indian context. Our regression results show signs for discrimination variables that are coherent with 
this interpretation.
Third, the household answer is, in our opinion, interpretable as the household action. The 
variable measures the household perception of collective action in its community. This is a first nice 
information. But we also consider that the household answer is true for itself. Behavioral 
experiments tell us that people internalize their group norms, rules, and behavior. This has been 
shown by different authors and in different contexts (for example Bernhard et al. (2006)), (Goette et 
al. (2006)). We hence consider that in our setting, when families of the reference group of a 
household bond together, the household will internalize this norm and join them (hence cooperate). 
Conversely, if everyone stays alone to deal with the problem, so will do the household. Answering 
“each family individually” would sound absurd for a household which cooperates. And answering 
“bond together” when you stay on your own is strange. A free rider might do so, and you might 
have a bias because of households that would not assume their “selfishness”, which will over-
declare cooperative behavior. We consider that these types of households are not a majority. A 
comforting observation is the variation observed for the mean answer for cooperation, if you first 
consider it only by village, and if then you add social group distinctions. If you consider only the 
people of the same social group, and using the same water source, within each villages, answers 
means are more polarized than if you consider the village as a whole9. But there are still cases when 
a part of people declare to cooperate when their pairs declare not to, recognizing then that they are 
free riders.
3.2. Variable of interest: social distance
To account for social distance we will build a variable measuring the difference of yield to 
similar characteristics for different social groups. The building will be in two steps with first the 
building with a Propensity Score Matching of a counterfactual group with characteristics similar to 
SCs characteristics. Then we will run income regressions over the SC group and this counterfactual 
9. which might be interpreted as within a village some group have only cooperating members, and some 
group have none, hence the polarization of answers. But it might also be due to the resulting sample 
reduction. So the polarization of answers is hardly interpretable if alone
9to use the difference of predicted income with each regression coefficients as our distance variable 
(following the procedure of the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition).
3.2.1 The building of SCs’ counterfactual
We match the 4,290 SC households to the 4,290 non SC neither ST (scheduled tribe, another 
historically disadvantaged group) households that have characteristics similar to SCs of the 16,141 
contained in the database. The propensity score is estimated with SC being assimilated to “being 
treated” and with the outcome being income. We perform matching over an extensive list of 
variables accounting for individual and local settings. For individual controls: the type and place of 
activity, animals owned, the land possessed if any and part of it irrigated if any, education level, an 
index for productive goods owned, the kind of earnings, the household size and composition and 
hiring, whether the household is migrant, whether it is part of the most numerous group in the 
village. And for local controls: number of households in the village, what kind of road the village 
possesses, its electrification, and if it possesses a market. As well as district and state identifiers.
We perform nearest neighbour matching with no replacement, as we are not interested in 
who is matched to whom, but just in who among non SCST is selected as having similar 
characteristics. The imposition of common support implies a loss of only 8 observations as shown 
in table below. Even if it is obtained with a very rough technique it is worth noting that matching 
results show a negative average treatment effect (being SC) on the income, at one percent 
confidence level.
Off support On support Total
Untreated 0 11,577 11,577
Treated 8 4,290 4,298
Total 8 15,867 15,875
Table 3: Common support for the PSM
We check that the counterfactual built indeed has similar characteristics to our sample of 
SCs by pretending to perform another match on the already matched households sample. Compared 
to first matching only six covariates remain significant, three of them at five percent confidence 
interval and three of them at ten percent, with a R-squared falling from fourteen to 0.004 (tables 
presented in annex). So the matching is not perfect but hopefully we have erased  most of the 
differences in attributes between SCs and their counterfactual so that decreasing returns or other 
elements do no bias next step estimates (remaining significant variables are categorical ones or 
10dummies). All variables that remain with significant differences were included as potential 
covariates in the next step.
3.2.2. The estimation of an individual distance to the reference group
The individual distance variable is estimated by us, using an extension of the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition (Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)).
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is traditionally used to compute average discrimination 
from one group to the other. It considers the income gap, and explains a part of it with the 
difference of characteristics between groups, and the other part of it with “discrimination”. What is 
called discrimination is the fact that comparable characteristics have different yield according to the 
pertaining group (Oaxaca (1973)). The average discrimination for the average individual is then 
computed. But it is likely that an individual behaviour is affected by the discrimination she really 
suffers from. And a comparable average discrimination, from one geographic unit to the other, can 
correspond to extremely variable individual situations within these units. Hence having information 
at individual level is nicer to explain an individual behaviour, and it is also more relevant to account 
for individuals environment as precisely as possible.
Also, discrimination and distance are highly correlated, one being the translation of the 
other, respectively in the economic or in the social sphere  We will usually call the result social 
distance because what we are interested in here is discrimination impact on identity, that is related 
to the social sphere side10.
In order to estimate that individual discrimination, for members of different groups, we 
follow Rio et al. (2010) method. We estimate income equations for each group. We then compute 
regression coefficients and predict everybody's revenue with it. Each group coefficients indicate the 
yield of its characteristics. For household i of group g we compute two predicted incomes: the first 
one, ŷig, with his group coefficients; and the second one, ŷiḡ , with “reference” group coefficients. 
The difference between the two is the discrimination/distance variable of household i, belonging to 
group g :
Discrig  =  ŷig  _  ŷiḡ
From there we will compute relative discrimination. It can be computed with respect to 
household predicted income with group coefficient (RDiscrig  = Dig /  ŷig  ) or with reference group 
coefficients (RDiscrig  = Dig /  ŷiḡ ). These different specifications do not change the sign of our 
results even if they change their magnitude, and we will concentrate on discrimination relative to 
10. We would have focused more on the discrimination with difference of returns aspect   if people 
discriminating and discriminated had to cooperate together, because differences of return would then have 
had an impact. But here it is not the case.
11household own income, as it is supposed more relevant for the household perception of her 
situation.  
3.2.3. Income equations and predictions
Inspired by Borooah (2005) work on inequality and poverty in India, we estimate a log-
linear model: the log of the revenue11  is explained by a set of different variables. Explaining 
variables are inspired by Borooah (2005) with augmentations. The first set of covariates, W, 
includes land owned, the number of adult workers, the number of teenage workers, an index for the 
amount of (non-land) productive assets owned12 and the maximum level of education for adults in 
the household. All these are interacted with regional dummies. The second set, X,  is made of 
dummies for the different type of professional activities being the main income source, and for if 
the household belongs to the most numerous group in the village. And the third set, L, is made of 
three local controls: the number of households in the village, the accessibility of the village by road, 
and distance to the closest market. And we add District fixed effects. Previous studies at the 
aggregate   level   show   significant,   historically   rooted,   inter-district   variations   of   inter-caste 
relationships (see Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) or Banerjee et al. (2005)). The econometric 
specification is thus13:
yi g = ln(incomei g) = α0g + α1gWi + ∑Reg α1ReggRegioni*Wi  + α2gXi  + α3gLi +  εi 
Regressions are run for the two different social groups. Results of regressions over income 
and fit with actual income are presented in annex. Both regressions have R-squared above 0.40 and 
graph are engaging for the quality of predictions: except for some households at low income levels 
predictions are close from declared income. From there we also predict SCs income with reference 
coefficients; and compute the difference between that prediction and the one made with their actual 
coefficients.  The   resulting   distributions   of   income   are   presented   below.   One   can   observe 
confounded patterns for low attributes rewards. Then appears some “glass ceiling” with SCs' 
coefficients predicting SCs to be more numerous at medium level income, and less at higher level 
income, than reference coefficients.
11. We consider the declared income of the household minus the remittances declared, as these do not depend 
on  the surveyed household characteristics. Moreover remittances often come from persons exiled in a city or 
a foreign country, where caste or religious distinction shall be far less relevant than  in the village of origin.
12. Index equals to a weighted sum of the following goods (weights in parentheses): draft animals (4); pumps 
(5); tubewell (10); bullock carts (4); tractor (10); threshers or bio-gas plants (3).
13. The final specification was  chosen among others using Akaike Information Criteria. Except for irrigation 
that is a very poorly filled variable: including it leads to the loss of 1000 SCs observations for prediction. So 
we do not include it as a covariate as matching has smoothed it among groups, and its suppression does not 
bias our results (hausman test). Still its inclusion is presented in robustness checks.
12Graph 1: distribution of predicted incomes for SC households
Discrimination variable further used to proxy distance is presented in table 2. SCs appear to 
be on average disadvantaged by their coefficients. This is consistent with average treatment effect 
obtained from the matching, and also with replication for our data of Borooah (2005) results: with 
the full sample we find that 22,2% of income differences between SCs and non SCSTs is 
attributable to discrimination14.  These results are also consistent with Throat, Mahamanlik and 
Sadana survey results (in Throat Newman (2010)). They show that SCs are either excluded from 
market or suffer from systematic deviation from market price at their disadvantage, being 
sold/rented out products at high price, and bought/rented in products at low price. The estimated 
variable is negative for about 52% of the sample. We call negative discrimination the absolute value 
of the variable for SCs when it is negative, that is to say when their predicted income is higher with 
non SCSTs coefficients than with SCs coefficients. For the remaining 48% of the SC sample, 
discrimination would be “positive”. Descriptive statistics show a credible range for discrimination 
values. The low rate of negative discrimination may sound surprising but at least two things can 
contribute for it. First, the existence of various positive discrimination programs that have targeted 
14. This is far lower than Borooah finding of 36% of income difference attributable to discrimination, but 
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Kernel density estimateSCs and STs households since independence. Second, and more importantly, our variable is very 
likely to be an underestimation of the real difference of returns between SCs and the reference 
group.   Indeed   in   the   building   of   the   counterfactual   group   we   privileged   similarities   of 
characteristics. This leads us to keep in the sample Muslims, Christians, or other religions 
households, as well as households categorized as Other Backward Castes although all of them will 
occupy somewhat despised ranks in the social ladder and often suffer from economic discrimination 
(Thorat and Newman (2010)). So the counterfactuel is made of very different kind of households. 
Data limitations did unfortunately not allowed us to concentrate only on Hindu neither OBS nor SC 
households which would have led a far more clear cut picture.
But, although certainly undermined and not precise enough, we think that at least the 
negative outcomes of that discrimination variable does give a relevant ranking information, so we 
will use them to proxy social distance15.
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Absolute16 Positive 2601 5543.41 5421.6 2.279 32131.4
Negative 2812 6634.6 6515.4 3.168 35544.5
Relative Positive 2606 0.208 0.149 0.0001 0.709
Negative 2794 0.321 0.278 0.0001 1.463
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for predicted individual discrimination for SC households.
3.3. Control variables
Economic situation (household level). Variables at stake: income, land owned, difference from land 
owned to average land owned in the village (obtained from the village survey) and its square, 
difference from land owned to average land owned by the households group members and its 
square. These variables aim at accounting for the Olson effect at individual level. The idea is that 
people with a high income, or with a  lot of land, are the ones who shall benefit more from the 
collective action, hence they might cooperate more. On the contrary Bardhan et al. (2007) show 
15. We would still keep the positive outcomes as a control variable among others, that one could choose to 
interpret as a social distance variable, but the interpretation would be less straightforward than for negative 
outcomes. Shall one consider it as a lowering of SCs status, because it still marks social distance, or as an 
increasing of their status, because it is as if they were “rewarded” for being SCs? Knowing that it is likely to 
be overestimated. Plus, the correlation it shows with the outcome variable was less robust to alternate 
specifications than the one for negative outcomes. And, the sign of the effect makes it prone to interpretation 
as an Olson effect of the more well offs cooperating more, but also raises concerns of reverse causality. All 
these reasons make that we will not focus on these outcomes.
16 To be compared to annual incomes going from zero to Rs. 564000, with a mean of Rs. 31044.17 and a 
standard deviation of Rs. 34420.38.
14theoretically that efficiency within a group rises when within group equality rises. The inequality 
effect can be relevant at village level or at social group level and its effect is not necessarily linear.
Farming activity (household level).  Variables at stake: a dummy for firstly farmer households, land 
owned, tubewell owned. A household mainly depending on cultivation for living might be more 
interested in water source functioning than the one who use it only in order to drink or cook (it is 
easier in this case to use another water source, and have  less long term consequences). On the other 
hand, farmers are also more likely to own their own tube well (this is the case for 8,7% of our 
sample), and then depend less on the public source.
Social group (household level).  Variables at stake: group dummies for household caste or religion, 
and for if their group is the most numerous in the village, interaction term between group dummies 
and share of the corresponding social group in the village (provided by village survey), and square 
of this interaction term. A household’s social group is its reference of people to cooperate with. 
Within a group people share the same norms, and members of the group make sure these norms are 
respected (Bernhard et al. (2006), Goette et al. (2006)).  Group dummies allow accounting for 
different functioning from one group to the other. Some can be more prone to cooperate than others. 
As for the share of household’s social group in the village, it may also change cooperative behavior: 
the more numerous its pair’s proportion, the higher the probability that it has to cooperate only with 
them, with no out-side group intruders (and conversely for a small share). The shares might be 
interpreted as the household utility surplus coming from cooperation with it’s pairs (Vigdor (2002)), 
with a positive impact. But, on the other hand, larger groups can have more coordination problems 
(Bardhan (2000)). Also, belonging to the most numerous group raises your chance to have a second 
water source accessible and used by your group members, which shall decrease the likelihood to 
cooperate. So both signs are possible for these variables.
Other capital (household level).  Variables at stake: number of adult members, maximum level of 
education of an adult male member, fact to belong to village official or having a close relative in 
(these   people   might   tend   to   be   overoptimistic   about   cooperative   behavior   within   the 
circumscription).
Economic differences (village level). Variables at stake: gini and gini squared on income, or on land, 
inter-group component of the Theil index on land (built with Village survey) and its square. We can 
15thus control for the effect of village level economic heterogeneity. For Bardhan et al. (2007), there 
exist an optimal level of between group inequality and we account for this one.
Social fragmentation (village level). Variables at stake: fragmentation and polarization indexes, 
computed for all social groups distinguished in the village survey, and for major caste or religious 
groups. On the one hand we use village survey questions concerning the different “jatis” (traditional 
social groups) present in the village. There can be up to eight different ones within a village. We 
obtain general fictionalization and polarization indexes. These indexes are the most synthetic 
insofar as they account for caste and religious distinctions at the same time. But a higher 
aggregation level might be more relevant at a time when caste distinctions are said to be fading. So 
we also extract from the survey data the shares of people of each religion and of each broad caste 
categories (Brahmans, OBC, SC, ST) to compute other indexes.
Political context (village level). Variables at stake: a dummy for the presence of the local assembly 
building within the village (Pani Panchayat), and another dummy if the village benefices of a public 
program promoting safe drinking water in the village. These political facts might enhance the 
coercive institutions promoting cooperation.
Water sources (individual and village level). Dummies for household main water source, dummies 
for if he owns a tubewell or a pump, dummies for village main water source (provided by village 
survey), and the interaction between the two when corresponding.
All these control variables are used in our regressions, in order to account for households 
background, with a household individual characteristics, and its living place characteristics. 
Descriptive statistics of main variables are presented in annex. We choose the final specification 
using Akaike information criteria.
The final model can be written:
Cooperationi = β0 + β1Distancei + β2 IndivContolsi +  β3 VillageControlsi  +  εi
IV / Results
We first run two parsimonious probit regressions, to check for the non linearity of the effect 
of discrimination variable. The effect indeed appears as non linear, with both sign of the 
16discrimination variable significant at very high confidence levels17.  The negative discrimination, 
further called distance variable, has the expected effect on Cooperation: the more discriminated 
against (that is the higher the social distance) the more SCs cooperate. Our interpretation derives 
from formalization and previous finding exposed in section 2. Various interpretations are possible 
for the sign of the positive part of discrimination variable but as exposed above this result is not 
reliable (and will further appear not robust) so we will not comment upon it although the variable 
will be kept as control in further regressions.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Coop Coop
Discrimination toward SCs -0.0473
(0.0419)
Negative Discr toward SCs 0.192***
(0.0529)
Positive Discr toward SCs 0.166***
(0.0537)
Observations 24,213 24,213
log likelihood -8.440e+07 -8.420e+07
Pseudo R2 0.000206 0.00256
Robust standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Cooperative behavior prediction, parcimonious specifications (marginal effects)
A first endogeneity concern arising would be reverse causality. But this does not seem to be 
a relevant concern for us. The reverse causality relation relies on the intuition that free riders would 
be the more discriminated against. But, in our setting, discriminators aren't the people you are 
supposed to cooperate with. And, as a consequence, empirical results show the exact opposite: the 
more you are discriminated/distanced, the more you will cooperate. This rules out the reverse 
causality concern.
We then introduce the controls, presented in the previous section, with clustered standard 
errors at village level (to account for Moulton's bias). Each time we have to choose between two 
alternative controls, we run regressions with both, holding all other elements fix, and keep the 
specification with the highest log likelihood. The exception to this method is for some variables that 
are poorly reported and the use of alternate controls implies big variations for the number of 
observations. This is mainly the case for village variables on land owned, that are used to compute 
17. All presented regressions are without outliers though their inclusion would give exactly the same 
conclusions for sign and significance level of variables.
17economic inequality controls, and village variables on social group shares, used for group shares 
and fragmentation indexes. We thus present two alternative specifications. The first includes the 
maximum number of observations (column 3) and only properly filled control variables. The 
second((column 4)  includes extensive controls, no matter how well they are filled. One can see that 
in both cases the higher social distancing toward SCs, the more cooperation. Results are presented 
in table 6.
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Coop Coop Coop Coop Coop Coop
Distanciation as 
SCs
0.253*** 0.235*** 0.225** 0.199* 0.192 0.292
(0.0656) (0.0711) (0.110) (0.121) (0.121) (0.189)
Minimum Indiv 
Controls 
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Minimum Controls 
Village
yes yes - - - -
Extensive Controls - yes - yes - -
Village Random 
Effects









- - - - - Yes (1,077 
villages)
Observations 23,647 18,623 24,092 19,684 19,684 18,591
log likelihood -8.000e+07 -6.110e+07 -12208 -9930 -9943 -8263
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Cooperative behavior prediction
We then introduce village random effects, both for the well filled (5) and poorly filled model 
(6). The significance loss in the model with maximum variables filled is actually due to 
observations loss, as can be seen in column 7 when we run the same model as column 5 but on 
observations of column 6. A similar argument can be advanced for the loss of significance when we 
introduce fixed effects in a logit (a p value of 12%, column 8): the z stat of column 3 model re-
estimated on the restricted sample used for fixed effects decreases from 3.86 to 2.48. But a 
Hausman test further confirms that fixed effects are the efficient specification. This is a serious 
concern for the robustness of our result, though the fact that sample restriction leads to the loss of 
about one fifth of the sample, with among it observations leading the result, leaves us with no clear 
cut conclusion. 
18We then try to run again all the estimation procedure (from the beginning, with re-estimation 
of the social distance variable) without the 2,382 observations belonging to Bihar, Jharkand, and 
Tamil Nadu, three states for which consumption estimates do not converge with NSS data, raising 
concern on the sampling quality for these states. Predicted incomes do not differ from previous ones 
for SCs, neither with their coefficients, nor with reference coefficients (although state exclusion 
leads to a higher predicted income for the reference group). As a consequence the re-estimated 
distance variable does not significantly differ from the previous one. It remains significant at the 
highest level for the parsimonious specification. But it is only partially robust to the introduction of 
controls (with a p-value under 9% for the extended control specification). This significance drop is 
linked to the sample reduction, leading to key observations loss. We can unfortunately not address 
further that problem with existing data. So, given that our interest variable does not seem to be 
biased by the inclusion of these three states, we will go on working with it. Although aware that the 
strength of results is undermined by that potential sample bias.
(9) (10) (11)
VARIABLES Coop Coop Coop
Alternate measure Alternate measure Initial measure
Distanciation as SCs 0.571*** 0.444** 0.386*
(0.215) (0.279) (0.208)
Minimum Indiv  Controls  yes yes yes
Minimum Controls Village - - -
Extensive Controls - - -
Village Random Effects Yes (1,511 villages) - -
Village Fixed Effects - Yes (1069 villages) Yes (1069 villages)
Observations 23,075 17,726 17,726
log likelihood -11766 -7868 -7873
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7:  Robustness check, cooperative behavior prediction with alternate distance computation
One last robustness check is with modification of the income equations used to compute 
distance variable. New income equations are run, including a control for land irrigation18. 
Regressions results of village random and fixed effect specifications with minimum controls are 
shown in table 7 (colums 9 and 10), other results remain unchanged. The impact of distance 
measured with that alternate way is higher. This impact augmentation is partly due to sample 
reduction (as shown in column 11 if compared to column 8 of table 6). But not only, otherwise 
significance levels would be exactly the same in columns 10 and 11. Hence the alternate measure of 
18 Being poorly filled using it for income prediction leads to the loss of one fifth of SC households sample.
19distance -that includes irrigation and is a more accurate fit- has a better explicative power of 
cooperation than the previous one. This is a comforting result although it leaves us, once again, with 
no clear cut conclusion.
In the end what have we learned? Regressions ran do bring interesting insights and empirical 
support to the thesis exposed in the second section. The social distance impact is not robust to 
exclusion of three states with potential sample bias, this is a serious concern that we can 
unfortunately not address with current data. With two alternative measures of the distance variable 
the impact of social distance is perfectly robust to random effects inclusion, and partially robust to 
village fixed effects inclusion19. Whenever social distance has an impact it is the one we expected: 
being distanced by other households leads the set apart households to try to compensate for it. This 
compensation will be obtained through increased cooperation, because this goes along with a higher 
social status within the in-group.
As for a broad review of controls effects (full tables for some estimations are in annex), 
except through the amount of land owned (which effect can also be interpreted with corporatism or 
other reasons), neither richness nor inequality   seem to influence cooperative behavior. This 
reinforces our interest on social variables. As a macro variable, fragmentation of the village is not 
relevant to explain cooperation behavior. Polarization has instead a small positive impact, that can 
be linked to our second section explanation, with the conflict raising to two big group opposition to 
each other reinforcing each in-group identity. We can also deconstruct the micro foundation of the 
fragmentation index, following Vigdor(2002), and consider group shares. There appear to be some 
convex link between the share of Muslims in a village and their behavior of cooperation. This can 
be interpreted as the presence of some threshold of fellow group members below which the 
household does not cooperate because he has nobody from his in-group to cooperate with. Then, 
once the threshold is passed, the more in-group fellow members are in the village the more 
cooperative will be the household. As for SCs their intricate characteristics tend to be of lower 
cooperation than the reference social group (non SCST here), in all context or mainly when they are 
the dominant group. That last result is seemingly the most reliable as it appears when we include 
village random effects and it fits in the formalization exposed in the second section: when SCs are 
the most numerous they are less likely to suffer from out-group despise and cooperate less. One can 
also notice that the three more “political” variables included have an impact. Public program for 
water has a negative impact, hopefully because then the State substitutes itself to user-groups. Being 
19 With mitigate conclusions due to the fact that one fifth of the sample lives in villages without intra village 
variation of our dyadic cooperation variable.
20a Panchayat member lowers Cooperation, which is a surprising result, maybe linked to officials 
higher expectations before they report cooperation of their group. Eventually knowing somebody 
who belongs to the local assembly and is close from the household has a strong positive impact, 
which can have various explanation, from a real greater involvement in collective actions to over-
reporting. What is clear from that is that political and social context do matter. Except for land 
owned not a single economic variable is significant in all our regressions meanwhile social and 
political variables are.
V / Elements of Conclusion
Intra-group cooperation appears to depend on inter-group relationships. We have proxied 
intrer-group relationships with a distance variable. We have estimated how SCs individuals were set 
aside from Indian society today. This is blunt estimation, and it contains imperfections among 
which a very likely  underestimation of actual social distance. The distance variable obtained is then 
introduced as an explicative variable of households’ cooperative behavior. It appears to have a 
significant explicative power for SC  households’ behavior. This explicative power is robust to 
outliers removal, variation in specifications, regression model used, and village random effects. It is 
partially robust to village fixed effects and not robust to sample modification (with removal of three 
states).
To put it in a nutshell, the more, as a SC household, you are set apart from the rest of the 
society, the more you will cooperate with your in-group members. Our interpretation of this result is 
through identity economics literature: a distanced household shall tend to identify more to his group 
of origin, and a reinforced identification will implie reinforced norms, raising in-group cooperation. 
The household will seek for his pairs recognition, through an action they promote, to compensate 
for the identity loss of being despised by out-group members. Thus this article is a bridge between 
identity literature results, mostly theoretical or derived from experimental settings, and a growing 
empirical literature looking at which community characteristics are the best for cooperation and 
public goods existence and maintenance. The identity economics theoretical and experimental 
insights are confirmed by our results on survey data: identification to the in-group matters for 
cooperation. And this identification depends, among other things, of how out-group members treat 
you.
The aim of this article is not to enhance between group distance positive aspects, but to point 
at a mechanism reinforcing cooperation. This mechanism is in line with the work done on identity 
economics, showing that identity payoffs can be  important determinants of one economic decision 
21-here cooperation (Akerlof and Kranton (2000)).  Results presented in this article show that 
enhancing group identities reinforce cooperation. But groups can be defined along a lot of social 
lines and the aim is not to support caste communitarianism or anything alike. Singh (2011) article 
shows that in today's Kerala a state level identity has been built, that means more for its inhabitant 
than their caste or religious distinctions, or their Indian identity. If the growing literature in identity 
goes on showing its importance for  major economic decisions, the way identities can be reinforced 
or defined along new lines, stimulating one or another aspect of identity (as done by McLeish and 
Oxoby (2011)), would become a major question for policy makers.
This article is a first step in showing that in-group cooperation behavior is, among other 
things, explained by out-group members comportment: bad inter-group relationships are detrimental 
for inter-group cooperation, but enhance intra-group cooperation. For future research this element 
shall be taken in account in aggregated work, studying at local level how many public goods are 
presents: when public goods can be partially privatized (each group being able to use or have its 
own one reserved for itself), the worst inter-group relationships, the more public goods. Wells, but 
also education, or health facilities, are examples of goods that can be privatized. In such cases 
fragmentation indexes, or polarization indexes, will not give enough information to understand 
communities’ collective actions. Further research is needed to find the best proxy of inter-group 
relationships, both at individual and at aggregated level.
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24Annex 1. Descriptive statistics
Household variables
Observations Mean Std. Min. Max.
Income 26733 41194.4 69805.72 -108327.8 3945151
Land 26598 2.192858 5.501518 0 200
Land Gap 23510 -2.936466 16.45299 -481.9873 199.368
Education 25137 6.157935 4.846223 0 15
Nb Adults 26734 2.820042 1.410575 0 14
Mainly Farmer* 26734 35.63 - - -
Main Group* 26,734 47.79 - - -
*:dummy variables: the mean actually indicates the proportion of mainly farmer households, or 
households member of the most numerous group in their village.
Caste 
groups  Freq. Percent Cum.
Brahmin 1,092 4.08 4.08
OBC 10,703 40.04 44.12
SC 5,952 22.26 66.38
ST 2,936 10.98 77.37
Other 6,051 22.63 100.00
Total 26,734 100.00
Dominant 
Caste  Freq. Percent Cum
Brahmin 24 1.58 1.58
SC 74 4.87 6.45
ST 122 8.02 14.47
Other 1301 85.53 100.00
Total 1,521 100.00  
25Village variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share Muslim 1408 .088821 .215274 0 1
Share Christian 1408 .0191832 .102874 0 1
Share Tribal 1408 .0096307 .0873181 0 1
Share SC 1408 .187294 .194871 0 1
Share ST 1408 .1218253 .26002 0 1
Share Brahmin 1408 .045973 .1270782 0 1
Fractionalization Index 1408 .5918539 .2095463 0 .865
Caste Frac. 1408 .440544 .2143398 0 .9305
Religious Frac. 1408 .1493354 .1993432 0 1
Polarization Index * 1408 .668065 .1910349 0 1
Caste RQ 1408 .675351 .2732703 0 1
Religious RQ 1408 .2755035 .3404272 0 1
Gini Land 1372 .3728095 .1506648 0 .838779
Theil Inter 1223 1301.726 2263.493 .2164202 29201.26
Local Public Assembly** 1481 22.96 - - -
Public Water Programm** 1481 60.23 - - -
*: Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) polarisation index.
** : dummy variables, the mean actually indicates the percentage of villages with event happening.
26
Village main
water source Freq. Percent Cum.
Piped 598 40.41 40.41
Tube well 198 13.38 53.78
Hand pump 485 32.77 86.55
Dug, open well 132 8.92 95.47
Covered well 29 1.96 97.43
River, canal 16 1.08 98.51
Pond 7 0.47 98.99
Tanker truck 9 0.61 99.59
Rainwater 2 0.14 99.73
Bottled 1 0.07 99.80
Other 3 0.20 100.00
Total 1,480 100.00  Annex 2: Propensity score matching estimate.






Nb ADULTS 0.0390*** 0.0151
(0.0102) (0.0123)
Nb TEEN 0.0274** -0.00624
(0.0121) (0.0144)
Owns Land (dummy) -0.0745 -0.0249
(0.0504) (0.0641)
Amount Owned -0.124*** -0.000197
(0.0104) (0.0156)
Irrigated land (dummy) -0.129** -0.0515
(0.0640) (0.0834)
Share Irrigated (categorial) 0.0119 0.00246
(0.0253) (0.0336)
Hired farm Labour 0.00714 0.00704
(0.0116) (0.0138)
Productive Assets -0.00666** 0.00239
(0.00279) (0.00398)
Big Animals -0.105*** -0.0574**
(0.0195) (0.0262)
Small Animal -0.00153 0.000592
(0.00654) (0.00980)
Works at home -0.324*** -0.0710
(0.0515) (0.0669)
Works in fixed place -0.439*** -0.0466
(0.0534) (0.0715)
Moves for work -0.144** -0.167**
(0.0602) (0.0713)
Hired Buissness Labour -0.358*** 0.140
(0.0862) (0.130)
Income from Rent -0.216** -0.0387
(0.0919) (0.124)
Income from Pension -0.181*** -0.0174
(0.0660) (0.0858)
Income from Sale -0.167 -0.210
(0.104) (0.129)
Max Adult Education -0.0266*** -0.00720**
(0.00277) (0.00333)
Administrative Work -0.0909** 0.0141
(0.0361) (0.0458)
Nb of HH in Village -9.44e-05*** 8.01e-06
(1.35e-05) (1.75e-05)
Village access by road -0.000269 0.0165
(0.0221) (0.0267)
Pct Village elecrified 0.00123*** 0.000698
(0.000394) (0.000470)
27Closest Market -0.000304 0.00414*
(0.00202) (0.00238)











log likelihood -7965 -5921
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28Annex 3: Income equations for SCs and their counterfactual.
Reference Grp SCs
VARIABLES ln(Income) ln(Inccome)
Occup: Allied Agr 0.418*** 0.355**
(0.131) (0.158)
Occup: Ag Labour 0.312*** 0.146***
(0.0624) (0.0558)
Occup: Non-Ag Labour 0.358*** 0.301***
(0.0624) (0.0579)
Occup: Artisan 0.433*** 0.305***
(0.0841) (0.0880)
Occup: Petty trade 0.298*** 0.303***
(0.106) (0.0917)
Occup: Business 0.653*** 0.299***
(0.107) (0.0836)
Occup: Salaried 0.777*** 0.741***
(0.0864) (0.0761)
Occup: Profession 0.443*** 0.309
(0.155) (0.318)
Occup: Pension/rent 0.370** 0.290*
(0.169) (0.149)
Occup: Others 0.0712 -0.375
(0.146) (0.316)
Works at home 0.196** 0.222***
(0.0808) (0.0588)
Works in fixed place 0.198** 0.307***
(0.0772) (0.0629)




Dominant Grp Member 0.109*** 0.0350
(0.0389) (0.0355)
Land Owner -0.0844* -0.107***
(0.0488) (0.0373)
Big Animals 0.0877*** 0.114***
(0.0286) (0.0286)


















































Village road 0.103*** 0.0210
(0.0296) (0.0314)
Closest Market -0.00875** -0.00361
(0.00400) (0.00293)




District Fixed Effects yes yes
Observations 3,975 4,019
R-squared 0.422 0.425
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30Annex 4: Predicted incomes compared to actual incomes for the reference group 
and SCs
31Annex 5: Cooperation determinants, with village random  effects.
(S3) (S4) (S5) (S8)
VARIABLES Coop Coop Coop Coop
Distance Variables
Distanciation as SC 0.253*** 0.235*** 0.225** 0.199*
(0.0656) (0.0711) (0.110) (0.121)
Individual Controls
Positive Discrimination 0.276*** 0.231** 0.150 0.136
(0.0658) (0.0963) (0.174) (0.189)
SC -0.0587** -0.0696* 0.00506 -0.0902
(0.0290) (0.0415) (0.0489) (0.0761)
ST -0.0547 0.0504 0.0321 0.0276
(0.0359) (0.0518) (0.0674) (0.103)
OBC - - - -
Brahmin - - - -
Muslim -0.0355 0.0565 0.0254 -0.00594
(0.0374) (0.0460) (0.0698) (0.107)
Christian 0.144 - 0.140 -
(0.0987) (0.257)
Tribal 0.338*** - 0.757 -
(0.0526) (0.546)
Member dominant group -0.0456 0.0352 -0.00861 0.0271
(0.0418) (0.0483) (0.0769) (0.0866)
SC*DominantGroup 0.0553 -0.0594 -0.0726 -0.268**
(0.0428) (0.0695) (0.0859) (0.122)
ST*DominantGroup 0.0846 0.0503 -0.122 -0.346
(0.0559) (0.102) (0.108) (0.216)
Brahmin*DominantGroup 0.0263 -0.0211 0.0510 0.0817
(0.0402) (0.0481) (0.0756) (0.0865)
Muslim'DominantGroup 0.0701 0.0940 -0.0223 -0.0325
(0.0510) (0.0750) (0.113) (0.198)



























Owned Land 0.00250 0.00361 0.0163*** 0.00669
(0.00289) (0.00376) (0.00527) (0.00832)
Income 4.60e-08 3.27e-08 -5.25e-07 -6.05e-07
(1.98e-07) (2.25e-07) (3.77e-07) (5.66e-07)








Mainly farmer household -0.0147 -0.0196 -0.0629** -0.0607*
(0.0156) (0.0175) (0.0279) (0.0314)
Owns Tubewell -0.00353 -0.0200 0.0576 0.0561
(0.0226) (0.0247) (0.0381) (0.0434)
Owns Electric Pump -0.0126 -0.00837
(0.0261) (0.0477)
Owns Gaz Pump -0.0214 -0.0972*
(0.0242) (0.0515)
Maximum Adult Education -0.000691 0.00320
(0.00129) (0.00263)
Maximum Male Education  0.000392 0.00570**
(0.00145) (0.00289)
Number of adults 0.00384 0.00598 -0.00237 0.00214
(0.00463) (0.00522) (0.00907) (0.0100)
Member local assembly -0.0301 -0.0571 -0.167** -0.231**
(0.0427) (0.0416) (0.0829) (0.0900)
Relative member local assembly 0.0618*** 0.0828*** 0.181*** 0.208***
(0.0216) (0.0239) (0.0370) (0.0412)
Main Water Sources: for household, interaction with village one, village one
Piped -0.0135 -0.0702 0.0110 0.179
(0.0672) (0.0659) (0.0973) (0.110)
Handpump -0.0135 -0.0293 0.139 0.215**
(0.0553) (0.0543) (0.0902) (0.100)
Openwell -0.0159 -0.0427 -0.0130 0.113
(0.0552) (0.0536) (0.0892) (0.0989)
River 0.164*** 0.0920 0.360** 0.149
(0.0572) (0.0916) (0.142) (0.170)
Tubwell -0.0736 -0.0923 0.117 0.169
(0.0677) (0.0638) (0.0998) (0.110)
Piped*VillagePiped 0.0859* 0.111** 0.130* 0.0513
(0.0510) (0.0542) (0.0730) (0.0831)
HandPump*VillageHandPump -0.0481 -0.0397 -0.113* -0.0944
33(0.0458) (0.0496) (0.0662) (0.0719)
OpenWell*VillageOpenWell -0.0603 -0.0403 -0.139 -0.198*
(0.0606) (0.0651) (0.0978) (0.107)
River*VillageRiver - - 5.235 5.466
(2,101) (1,188)
TubeWell*VillageTubewell -0.146** -0.148** -0.398*** -0.432***































Public programm Safe Water -0.0554** -0.0633**
(0.0229) (0.0252)
Official local assembly building -0.0275 -0.0200
(0.0260) (0.0290)




Observations 23,647 18,623 24,092 19,684
log likelihood -8.000e+07 -6.110e+07 -12208 -9930
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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